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INTRODUCTION 
The growth of labelled green bonds (LGBs) in China since 2016 has been phenomenal1.  LGB 
issuance (domestically and internationally) in China was US$34 billion in 2016 (or 39% of the 
global total), up from a starting point of US$1 billion in 2015 (UNE, 2017). This means that 
China contributed 87% of the global LGB issuance growth from 2015 to 2016. Moreover, in the 
first three quarters of 2017, China issued LGBs worth USD20.91 bn, accounting for 23% of the 
global total (CBI and CCDC, 2017b).   
 
Through this development, China is acquiring a new identity, namely as a global front runner, if 
not leader, in green finance2. It has been praised for ‘showing thought leadership’ in green 
finance by a top UK official3. After the promulgation of the national Guidelines for Establishing 
the Green Financial System jointly by seven ministries in August 2016, China is now considered 
by some as ‘the most proactive country in the world in pursuing a coordinated and 
comprehensive approach to greening its financial system’ (Gilbert and Zhou, 2017:1), or ‘the 
leading force in green finance across the globe’ (IIGF and UNE, 2017:14). This new identity 
forms a strong contrast with China’s laggard environmental and sustainable development 
record. A decade ago, China was considered as one of the ten ‘rogue’ environmental states 
(Lindqvist, 2007). Even today, China ranks 120th out of 180 countries in the 2018 Environmental 
Performance Index (Yale Center et al., 2018), and 71st out of 157 countries on the Sustainable 




   
 
So what has caused China’s meteoric rise in green finance in such an apparently inhospitable 
environment and in such a short time? More specifically, what role has the UK-China strategic 
partnership played in this development? China introduced the G20 Green Finance Study Group 
(GFSG)4 in 2016 during its G20 presidency and has co-chaired the group alongside UK ever 
since. Moreover, recent rounds of China-UK Economic and Financial Dialogues (EFDs) have 
made green finance a priority area for the partnership between UK and China. However, as will 
be shown later in this article, UK appears to have not benefited much in business terms from 
this development.  How do we understand and explain this puzzle? 
 
Focusing on the afore-mentioned questions, this article examines the role of UK-China 
collaboration in promoting green finance (especially LGBs) development in China, the extent to 
which it meets the UK’s wider objectives regarding UK-China bilateral relationship and the 
underlying factors. Drawing on desk research and interviews conducted as part of a British 
Academy funded project, this article argues that while this collaboration has contributed to the 
development of green bond market in China largely through learning, its effect on UK-China 
trade is limited, falling far short of UK’s expectation. We explain this asymmetry by highlighting 
the underlying structural barriers created principally by China’s macro-economic control regime.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Part One provides a brief overview of UK-China 
trade relations. Part Two explores theoretical perspectives that could shed light on the present 
topic and their relevance to the research questions. Guided by these perspectives, Part Three 
then analyses the growth of green bond market in China and the UK-China collaboration. Part 
Four concludes. 
 
UK-CHINA TRADE RELATIONS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
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The UK-China relations were historically dominated by the issue of Hong Kong. After the return 
of Hong Kong to the Chinese sovereignty in 1997, however, UK government’s efforts shifted to 
engagement.  At the same time, the two sides experienced what Brown (2016) calls ‘reversed 
asymmetry between the two powers’ (p. 6), namely that, while UK was a more powerful 
economy and a greater geopolitical player before 1997, China has increasingly risen above the 
UK afterward. 
 
The UK government’s strategy towards China is expressed in a strategy paper, The UK and 
China: A Framework for Engagement, issued by the FCO (2009) in the final days of the New 
Labour government.   This document identifies three discrete areas where the UK ‘could and 
should work with China’. These areas include: (a) getting the best for UK from China’s growth; 
(b) fostering China’s emergence as a responsible global player; (c) promoting sustainable 
development, modernisation and internal reform in China (p. 27). Obviously, this formulation is 
an uneasy mixture: while the first element is an expression of naked self-interest in terms of 
economic gains, the second echoes the call by US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in 
2005 for China to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ (Shambaugh and Ren, 2012); the third 
element attests to UK’s wish to encourage China onto a liberal, modernising and sustainable 
development path. UK’s approach also resonates with the EU’s strategy towards China (Fox 
and Godement, 2009). 
 
Within the three-pronged framework, financial collaboration has gained increasing importance 
over the time. This focus seems to be a good choice, as China embarks on its transformation 
towards a services-led economy and the internationalisation of its currency RMB. On the UK’s 




   
 
‘For Britain, if it does succeed in the key area of becoming the centre for RMB trading 
and China’s partner of choice in the finance sector, it will have secured a major strategic 
role for itself in the relationship with this newly-burgeoning aspiring economic 
superpower.’ (pp. 66-67).  
 
In fact, following on UK’s success in making itself into the No.1 offshore hub for RMB business 
outside Greater China (SWIFT, 2018), green finance has become a new focus for China-UK 
collaboration in recent years. This focus is evident in the outcome documents of the recent 
rounds of China-UK EFDs. First mentioned in the 5th EFD outcome document in October 2013, 
green finance has acquired its own section from the 8th EFD in 2016. 
 
Let us now turn to the patterns of UK-China trade. There are four key features. First, the 
contribution of China as a trade partner for UK, though increasing, is still small. It accounted for 
5.2% of UK’s total foreign trade value in 2016 (see Table 1). Second, the structure is heavily 
skewed towards goods. 82.2% of UK’s exports to China were in goods in 2016. By comparison, 
goods accounted for only 55% of UK’s total exports. As of 2016, China was UK’s 6th largest 
export market (4.5% of UK total) and the 2nd largest source of import (9.3% of UK total) for 
goods, but ranked 17th as an export market and 23rd as a source of imports for services.  Third, 
the balance of payments has persistently been to the favour of China. Throughout 2006-2016, 
the UK ran a trade deficit with China, reaching £24.7 billion in 2016 (59.2% of total), although it 
consistently ran a trade surplus with China on services, reaching £1.7bn in 2016.  
Table 1. Indicators of UK-China Trade, 2009-2016 
Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
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UK’s exports to and 
imports from China 
(£m) 34224 42803 45988 46977 55014 56493 54221 59061 
China’s share of UK 
exports and imports 
(%) 4.1 4.6 4.5 4.5 5.1 5.3 5.1 5.2 
China’s share of UK 
exports (%) 
1.9 2.3 2.6 2.8 3.5 3.6 3.2 3.1 
China’s share of UK 
imports (%) 6.2 6.6 6.3 6.1 6.7 6.8 6.9 7.2 


















China’s share of UK’s 
trade deficit (%) 57.2 53.2 79.3 55.5 54.0 51.0 66.1 59.2 
UK-China trade deficit 
in services (£m) 1332 1402 1206 1250 1288 1182 1462 1707 
Share of goods in UK’s 
total exports to China 74.6 79.3 81.0 81.0 76.9 82.1 77.8 80.2 
Value of UK’s service 
exports to China (£m)  1916 2164 2466 2704 4143 3380 3642 3329 
Source: ONS, UK Balance of Payments, The Pink Book: 2017. 
Fourth and finally, the role of financial services does not match the policy emphasis assigned to 
it. Within UK’s exports in services to China, finance ranks 4th place in terms of value (Table 2).  
As of 2016, it accounted for 8.0% of UK’s total service exports to China, compared with 35.2% 
for travel, 20.6% for transportation and 18.3% for ‘other business services’. It is also evident in 
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Table 2 that although UK’s exports of financial services to China grew by 7.7% from 2015 to 
2016, the growth rate was the lowest among the five sectors that recorded growth.  
Table 2. UK Service Exports to China by Type of Service (£million)  
 2015 2016 Change* (2015-16)  
Transportation 552 687 + (24.5%) 
Travel 1613 1171 - 
Construction 16 35 + (118.8%) 
Insurance & pension 19 19 0 
Financial 248 267 + (7.7%) 




181 210 + (16.0%) 
Other business 
services 
640 610 - 
Personal, cultural and 
recreational 
66 75 + (13.6%) 
Government 102 102 0 
Total services 3642 3329 - 
Source: ONS, UK Balance of Payments, The Pink Book: 2017. *Positive (+) and negative (-) 
signs represent respectively positive and negative growth. 
In the specific area of LGB issuance, London has been able to win two out of nine offshore 
deals by Chinese issuers (see Table 3). However, in terms of the amount of capital raised, 
London’s share is only 18%, compared with Luxembourg’s 60%. More on this later. 
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PERSPECTIVES 
The above discussion raises two key research questions: 1. How can we explain the dramatic 
growth of green bond market in China since 2016? 2. Why has UK failed to benefit significantly 
from this growth despite its explicit policy objective? 
 
Our hypothesis is that the key driving force for green finance in China is the coupling of the 
financialisation of its economy and the centrally-orchestrated pursuit of ‘ecological civilisation’ 
from 2012 (accentuated from 2015), rather than external factors. On the other hand, the scope 
for UK to benefit from this growth is limited by the structure of UK-China trade (especially limited 
trade in financial services), China’s strong macro-economic control regime and its approach to 
international relations that prioritises learning and identity transformation rather than the 
opening-up of its markets. Below, we explore these aspects in further detail, starting with an 
evaluation of the relevant theoretical literature on international relations. 
 
Perspectives on UK-China Relations: Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism 
Each of the three dominant schools of the International Relations discipline can shed some light 
on the UK-China collaboration here. Realists argue that, because of the anarchic structure of 
the international system, the competition for power is central to international relations 
(Mearsheimer, 2016). This competition has the tendency to precipitate inter-state conflict and 
stimulate efforts by states to secure their position or maintain the balance of power through 
various strategies, of which three could be relevant here. In this perspective, the UK may 
bandwagon on a rising China (Schweller,1994) or engage in internal or external balancing. 
Inversely, China may adopt a hedging strategy in its engagement with UK to counter UK’s ability 
to constrain itself through building diplomatic, economic, and political relationships with third 
states or organizations, in the event of a deteriorating relationship (Goh, 2006).  
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In contrast, liberals stress the influence of processes and institutions on state action. Liberals 
argue that ‘process can generate cooperative behaviour, even in an exogenously given, self-
help system.’ (Wendt, 1992: 392). Emphasising the role of markets, free trade and competition, 
liberals believe that inter-dependencies through economic exchanges and international 
institutions are a good guarantee for greater security for both sides (Russett, 2016). Some 
liberals assert an important role for the transformation of identities and interests in explaining 
state action. A particularly insightful argument in the liberal tradition is that increased 
transactions and contacts change attitude and state’s definition of their interests through 
learning. Learning occurs internationally when ‘new knowledge is used to redefine the content of 
the national interest.’ (Nye, 1987: 378).  Nye makes a distinction between simple and complex 
learning: 
‘Simple learning uses new information merely to adapt the means, without altering any 
deeper goals in the ends-means chain. The actor simply uses a different instrument to 
attain the same goal. Complex learning, by contrast, involves recognition of conflicts 
among means and goals in causally complicated situations, and leads to new priorities 
and trade-offs.’ (p. 380) 
UK’s policy framework towards China is a clear embodiment of the liberal tradition. Indeed, in its 
relationship with China, UK has tried to present itself as ‘uniquely liberal’ (Brown, 2015). Breslin 
(2004) finds it possible to justify the twin-goal (to develop commercial opportunities for UK 
companies and to promote positive social and political changes in China) of UK’s post-1997 
China policy in the liberal tradition. A study by Fox and Godement (2009) of EU member states’ 
attitude towards China characterises the UK as ‘economically liberal and politically critical’ 
towards China. It could be argued that learning is central to the pursuit of UK’s second and third 
goals towards China. 
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Finally, constructivists challenge the shared view by neorealists and neoliberalists that states’ 
interests are given exogenously by structure and argue that identities and interests are shaped 
or constructed by social interactions between diverse actors (Wendt, 1992). A key insight of 
constructivism is that identities inform interests, and that both can change. Wendt (1992) 
specifies a four-stage process in which an egoist (like China) could seek to transform its identity 
through the interaction between its own actors and those of other states. These stages include: 
(a) the breakdown of consensus about identity commitment; (b) the identification of new 
possible selves and aspirations; (c) inducement for the alter to take on a new identity; (d) being 
rewarded by the alter. 
In the constructivist perspective, UK and China could be engaging in a process of developing 
new intersubjective identities for each other through their collaboration on green finance. This 
interpretation would be consistent with evidence from elsewhere. Research shows that UK 
policy makers and the public tend to construct UK’s own positive identity through its foreign 
policy. While it was once a common practice to portray UK as a good and caring colonist in 
comparison with other European powers such as the French, today UK increasingly adopts a 
view that sees itself as a tutor who could coach China to become a responsible player in 
international affairs (Gallagher, 2011). As a market leader in financial industry, coaching China 
to explore green finance would be a natural position for UK to assume.  
On the other hand, such a partnership of learning would serve China’s interests well. 
Admittedly, China’s foreign policy and the discourse on its own identity have been dominated by 
realist views (Shambaugh and Ren, 2012).  For much of the past two decades, China has 
practiced a strategy of taoquang yanghui (keeping a low profile) in international relations partly 
due to the lack of confidence to be more active or play a leadership role. This practice has made 
China a ‘partial power’ according to Shambaugh (2013), with its economic might under-matched 
by its global influence. Under President Xi’s leadership, however, China since 2014 has shown 
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increased interest in contributing to global governance and offering what its leaders describe as 
‘Chinese solutions’ for meeting challenges facing the mankind (Xi, 2014, 2017). Learning could 
arguably be an important aspect of this new posture, although it has not been officially framed in 
this way. 
International relationship is of course only part of the equation influencing the UK-China 
collaboration over green finance. As widely acknowledged, domestic politics often plays a 
crucial role in determining national interest and foreign policies (see for example Nye, 1987; 
Sterling-Folker, 2016). We now turn to the domestic landscape.  
Different Systems at Home: Neoliberalism vs Financial Statism 
As birthplace of both John Locke and Adam Smith, UK has long been a bastion of the liberal 
tradition. More recently, from May 1979, when the Conservative Party of Margaret Thatcher was 
elected to power, successive UK governments have adopted a neoliberal approach to economic 
policy (Arestis and Sawyer, 2005). Among others, key components of the neoliberal approach 
include a belief in the superiority of the market to the state and of private property to public and 
social ownership, retreat from industrial policy, emphasis on competition policy and the 
promotion of foreign direct investment. 
A key feature of neoliberalism is financialisation (Harvey, 2005). The latter is broadly defined as 
‘the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial 
institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies’ (Epstein, 2005: 3). 
Financialisation entails high leverage in capital structure of firms, an emphasis on ‘shareholder 
value’ and an ‘equity culture’ (Dore, 2008).  Along with globalization and neoliberalism, it has 
been characterised as one of the three profound transformations that have occurred since the 
1970s across the world (Epstein, 2005). Crucially, UK has been a key beneficiary of 
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financialisation, with London universally acknowledged as a top global financial centre (Sassen, 
2001; Yeandle, 2017) 
There has been a parallel process of financialisation in China, from the second half of the 
1990s. This process dates back to China’s Shareholding System (gufengzhi) reform as part of 
its policy package to build a Socialist Market Economy (Zhang, 2004). The reform turned large 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) into shareholding enterprises to give the SOEs operational 
autonomy while enabling the state to maintain and exercise control.  
Existent research has highlighted evidence of financialisation in China. For example, from 1978 
to 2013, the contribution of finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE) to GDP had risen from 
1.5% to 5.9% and from 4.2% to 11.8% respectively (with acceleration after 2005). On the other 
hand, the proportion of net profits earned by A-share financial publicly listed corporations in the 
total net profits earned by all listed corporations increased from 7.4% in 2000 to 49.3% in 2009. 
Furthermore, over the course of 2004-2013, the proportion of profits earned through financial 
channels by non-FIRE enterprises rose from 3.3% to 19.6% (Zhang, 2015). As of 2014, China’s 
bond market was the third largest in the world. Moreover, the government is keen to encourage 
corporations to raise funds by bond issuance so as to reduce corporations’ heavy reliance on 
bank loans (Goldman Sachs, 2015). 
If financialisation represents a shared trend between UK and China, scrutiny reveals major 
differences in terms of the key players and the development dynamics.  Wang (2015) argues 
that the financialisation in China is unique in the preponderant role played by the Chinese state 
in spearheading the application of shareholder values and in creating China’s financial markets. 
He characterises this phenomenon as ‘the rise of the shareholding state’. In this sense, 
financialisation in China merely adds to the state’s toolkit for economic control in terms of 
regulation and budgeting. Wang writes: 
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‘Financialization of the state refers to the process in which the Chinese state transforms 
its management of the economy from administrative intervention and fiscal allocation to 
supervising its massive state assets according to shareholder value.’ (p.621) 
Wang suggests that the financialisation of the state in China is a solution for maintaining state 
control in the face of reduced roles of central planning- it uses the state ‘as a tool to create 
markets or to transform the state field into a market field’. For illustration, as of 2012, 953 state-
controlled corporations were listed in China. This number accounted for 40% of all listed 
companies and 51% of total market capitalization on the A-share market. China Development 
Bank (CDB) alone had issued 31% of China’s total securitized products by 2014 (Wang, 2015). 
Wang suggests that state developmentalism and entrepreneurship coupled with financialisation 
have created a new kind of state in China. Xu (2014) called this new system ‘financial statism’, 
which encompasses state-owned financial institutions, financial restraint policies and a capital 
control regime. Such a system gives the state extraordinary power by selectively relaxing or 
tightening control in areas of its choice. In this perspective the explosive growth of green bonds 
may be as much a side effect of the intensification of financialisation in China, as a result of a 
concerted effort to green the financial system in China.  
Politics of Greening Finance in China 
To fully appreciate the impetus for green finance in China, it is necessary to recognise China’s 
long-term development goals and strategies, and the priority assigned to green finance. Starting 
from the 13th Party Congress in October 1987, the Community Party of China Central 
Committee (CPCCC) has consistently articulated a strategy for China’s modernization, although 
the specific wording has changed over time under different top leadership. President Xi (2014) 
has explained these goals as follows: (a) to double the GDP and per capita income between 
2010 and 2020; (b) to accomplish the modernization programme and for China to become a 
13 
 
   
 
‘prosperous, strong, democratic and culturally advanced socialist country’ by 2050.  He 
characterises these goals as the ‘Chinese dream’. 
 
In this historic context, the ‘Scientific Outlook on Development’ introduced at the 17th Party 
Congress (Hu, 2007) represents a watershed. This outlook has ‘comprehensive, balanced and 
sustainable development as its basic requirement’ and takes ‘overall consideration as its 
fundamental approach’. It advocates ‘balanced development to ensure sound and rapid 
economic growth’ to quadruple the per capita GDP between 2000 and 2020. It also calls for the 
promotion of ‘a conservation culture by basically forming an energy- and resource-efficient and 
environment-friendly structure of industries, pattern of growth and mode of consumption’, thus 
ushering in the agenda of ‘ecological civilisation’ (shengtai wenming in Chinese). Subsequently, 
between 2007 and 2008, various Chinese authorities promulgated policies on green credit, 
insurance and securities (Aizawa and Yang, 2010). The 18th Party Congress report (Hu, 2012) 
further emphasises the integration of ecological progress – a term used inter-exchangeably with 
ecological civilization - into the other four areas (economic, political, cultural and social). As part 
of the integrated approach to ecological civilisation, the push for green finance development 
widened significantly after the 18th Party Congress and during the preparatory work for the 13th 
FYP (2016-2020).  
 
Political prioritisation is a key characteristic of green finance development in China. This 
situation is made clear in the CPCCC and the State Council’s (2015a) ‘Opinions  on Further 
Promoting Ecological Progress’ (hereafter ‘the Opinions’) and the ‘Integrated Reform Plan for 
Promoting Ecological Progress’ (hereafter ‘the Integrated Plan’) (CPCCC and State Council, 
2015b). The ‘Opinions’ not only emphasise the crucial role of ecological civilisation for the 
realisation of the ‘Chinese Dream’. They also call for efforts to carry out extensive international 
cooperation and ‘build up the image of a major responsible country’ and ‘transform green 
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development into new comprehensive national strength’. Outlining strategies for a multi-faceted 
transformation of China’s current socio-economic system, the Integrated Plan includes a call to 
establish a green finance system to further mobilise private capital. Eventually, the 13th FYP, 
announced in March 2016, pronounced a new economic development model embodied in five 
key words: ‘innovative’, ‘co-ordinated’, ‘green’, ‘open’ and ‘sharing’. Following the 
announcement of guidelines on the issuance of financial and corporate LGBs respectively by 
the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) (the central bank) (No. 39) and the National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC) (No. 3504) in December 2015, Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(SSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) published guidelines for their green bond pilot 
programmes respectively in March and April 2016.These concerted actions ushered in a wave 
of rapid expansion in green bond market in China. 
ANALYSING THE UK-CHINA COLLABORATION ON GREEN FINANCE 
In the light of the literature review in the previous part, it is hypothesised that while the 
combination of the financialisation of the state-cum-economy and strong political impetus 
towards ‘ecological civilisation’ has driven the tremendous growth of the green bond market in 
China, structural and strategic factors have limited the scope for UK businesses to be more 
deeply involved in and benefit from this growth. Below we test this hypothesis by focusing on 
two aspects: 1. How have UK and China collaborated over green finance and how has this 
collaboration supported the development of green bond market in China, transformed the 
respective national identities and facilitated learning ? 2. How has a dual market structure for 
green bonds, namely rapid expansion at home market and slow growth in overseas market, 
developed and limited the economic benefits to UK?  
UK-China Collaboration in Green Finance 
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International collaboration has played an integral role in supporting China’s effort to green its 
financial system through institutional learning. This role is evidenced in the early collaboration 
between the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) (Canada) and the 
Development Research Center (DRC) of the State Council in China and the work of the Green 
Finance Task Force (GFTF) involving the UNEP Inquiry into the Design of a Sustainable 
Financial System (hereafter ‘the UNEP Inquiry’). The former is a joint exploration by the IISD 
and the Finance Research Institute of the DRC. Initiated in the second half of 2013, this 18-
month project explored ‘policy options to support China in developing a “green financial system” 
and to encourage such developments internationally’ (IISD and DRC, 2014). Significantly all 
four of China’s key financial regulators participated in this work. The project’s final report, titled 
‘Greening China’s Financial System’ (IISD and DRC, 2015), presents a framework for green 
finance. The latter is a collaboration between the Research Bureau of the PBoC and the ‘UNEP 
Inquiry’, leading to the establishment of the GFTF in July 2014.  The GFTF involved more than 
40 experts, with a majority of whom drawn from within China. It published 16 background 
papers. Its final report, titled ‘Establishing China’s Green Financial System’, was published in 
April 2015. This report makes 14 recommendations including the promotion of green bonds 
(GFTF, 2015).  
 
Within this context, UK has played a major role in supporting green finance development in 
China through information and knowledge sharing as well as practical and moral support. As 
early as October 2013, two months before the establishment of the UNEP’s Inquiry in Jan 2014, 
the 5th China-UK EFD recognised green, circular and low carbon development as a source of 
new economic growth and acknowledged the importance of collaboration between the public, 
private and financial sectors in areas including carbon markets, green finance, and standards 
and regulation (HMT and FCO, 2013). When the GFTF was established under the co-
sponsorship of the PBoC and the UNEP’s Inquiry, Sean Kidney, CEO of the UK-based Climate 
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Bonds Initiative (CBI), was one of the eight named international experts. The international 
version of the GFTF’s final report was produced with financial support from UK’s Department for 
International Development (DFID) (GFTF, 2015). 
In subsequent years, often with funding from the FCO, CBI has played a key role in supporting 
the development of green bond market in China.  It acted as an advisor, information and 
knowledge disseminator, champion, cheerleader and independent monitor for green bonds in 
China. CBI’ activities have included:  
• Publication of ‘How to Grow Green Bonds in China’ in March 2014; 
• Publication of ‘Growing a green bonds market in China: Key recommendations for 
policymakers in the context of China’s changing financial landscape’ report in March 
2015; 
• Publication of its series of China Roadmap 2016 reports (a total of 4 papers, in both 
languages) with funding from the FCO; 
• Publication of a Chinese version of its annual flagship publication ‘Bonds and Climate 
Change’ from 2016; 
• Co-development of the ChinaBond China Climate-aligned Bond Index with China Central 
Depository & Clearing Co. Ltd (CCDC) and China Energy Conservation and 
Environment Protection Consulting Co. Ltd (CECEP) in 2016;  
• Co-production of the ‘Study of China’s Local Government Policy Instruments Policy 
Instruments for Green Bonds’ (April in 2017, in Chinese and English) with FCO funding;   
• In its first ever Green Bond Awards in February 2016 (for 2015) and then in March 2017 
(for 2016) respectively, CBI recognised the PBoC as a ‘Pioneer in Green Bond Policy 
Development’ and ‘Innovative Regulator’. Several other Chinese institutions have also 




   
 
Apart from CBI, other UK institutions also contributed. UK’s Green Investment Bank’s Green 
Investment Handbook was translated into Chinese and is widely circulated in China. The co-
chairmanship of the G20 GFSG by the PBoC and the Bank of England represents perhaps the 
most visible effort of mutual support, learning and new identity-building for the two countries. 
Furthermore, in 2017, the China-UK Green Finance Task Force was established by the Green 
Finance Committee of China Society for Finance and Banking and the City of London’s Green 
Finance Initiative. Designed to increase financial cooperation between the two nations and grow 
green investment and opportunities, this task force has held regular meetings, facilitated 
learning about how to work with financial markets and provided opportunities for China to 
publicise what it is doing with green finance.5 
 
The co-development of the ChinaBond China Climate-Aligned Bond Index, launched in 
September 2016, illustrates well how UK-China collaboration helps. This Index is jointly 
developed by the CCDC, CECEP and CBI. While CCDC provided data on all the bonds traded 
on the domestic interbank bond market and stock exchanges in China from the 31st December 
2009, CBI and CECEP identified bonds that are in line with CBI’s Climate Bonds Taxonomy 
(CBT) and the PBoC’s Green Bond Endorsed Project Catalogue (PBoC, 2015). Based on this 
list of qualified bonds, CCDC then constructed the index, with the results updated monthly and 
made available on Bloomberg, Thompson-Reuters, Wind and Finchina. The Index is made up of 
210 bonds amounting to RMB 1.3 trillion, with transport sector claiming 91% of issuance (CBI et 
al., 2016). CBI’s CBT is also one of the four standards that the CCDC used to construct two 
other indices, ChinaBond China Green Bond Index and ChinaBond China Green Bond Selected 




   
 
The jointly developed ChinaBond China Climate-Aligned Bond Index has given China not only 
international visibility, but also generated real catalytic effects. For example, in November 2016, 
the Bank of China (BoC) launched one of the first Green Covered Bonds globally (and the first 
one out of China). The USD 500m issue was secured partly by a pledge of a portfolio of 
domestic climate-aligned bonds traded on China Interbank Bond Market. The LGB offers 
bondholders dual recourse to both BoC’s London Branch and a cover pool, which is made up of   
climate-aligned bonds on the banks’ balance sheets and included in ChinaBond China Climate 
Aligned Bond Index (CBI, 2017c). This example illustrates that market infrastructure jointly 
developed between UK and China has directly enabled the growth of Chinese LGBs. 
 
Therefore, the emergence of China as a global front-runner/leader in green finance can at least 
partly be attributed to the UK-China collaboration in this area. UK’s contribution can also find 
support in the policy outcome papers of the recent rounds of UK-China EFD. While the 
Outcomes Paper of the 7th UK-China EFD in September 2015 acknowledges the UK as ‘a world 
leader in green and sustainable finance’, the China-UK 8th EFD Outcomes Paper commits both 
to ‘support UK and China to become innovation centres of green finance’. It pledges to 
‘[S]upport the efforts of China and UK to green their financial systems, and together lead global 
efforts to grow the green finance market, through a UK-China Strategic Green Finance 
Partnership’. Finally, the Policy Outcomes Paper of the 9th UK-China EFD, which took place on 
the 16 December 2017, further states that ‘[T]he UK and China recognise each other as their 
primary partner in green finance for capital raising, product innovation and thought leadership. 
China and the UK have been jointly playing a leading role in driving global green finance 
development including through co-chairing the G20 Green Finance Study Group…’ (HM 
Treasury, 2017: 28). Evidently, China’s emerging global leadership in green finance is 
inseparable from the UK-China strategic partnership. 
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The significance of China’s newly acquired identity as a global leader in green finance is well 
recognised by key actors in China. For example, in his Foreword for the ‘Progress Report on 
Establishing China’s Green Financial System’ (IIGF and UNE, 2017), Shi Jianping (Vice 
President of the Central University of Finance and Economics and the Chairman of the 
International Institute of Green Finance), writes: 
‘China’s achievements in the field of green finance have become consolidated proof of 
the country’s promotion of ecological civilization construction,…China is becoming 
recognized by the international community for its leading role in worldwide green finance 
development with its innovative, yet effective, approaches. The achievements of China 
in the field of green finance have created a ‘Chinese Solution’, which has become a 
pattern for reference in developing green finance.’ 
 
The Making of a Dual Green Bond Market in China 
By the 31st May 2017, China had more than USD300 bn worth of climate aligned bonds6 out of a 
global universe of USD895 bn, more than twice as much as what the second largest issuer, the 
United State, held. The UK, in a fourth position (after France), had a little over USD 50 bn. 
China was the third largest issuer of LGBs, behind USA and France (CBI, 2017a). The extent of 
green bond development in China is indicated by the fact that LGBs make up 2% of total bond 
market in China, but less than 0.2% globally (Kidney and Liu, 2017). There is also a 
diversification of issuers.  In 2017, issuers spread from state to local level, evident in the surge 
of issuance by City Commercial Banks and Local government Financing Vehicles (CBI, 2017a).  
Nevertheless, there are causes for concern.  On the one hand, after the explosive growth in 
2016, the expansion of the green bond market continues, but at a much slower pace, falling 
short of the expectation of doubling the amount of 2016 (Kidney and Liu, 2017). Instead, the 
amount of issuance in the first three quarters of 2017 represents only an increase of 11.2% on 
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year-on-year basis (CBI and CCDC, 2017b). Closer examination reveals that the explosive 
growth in 2016 can be attributed to three key factors: 
1. The issuance in 2016 was driven by large, state-owned and -controlled financial institutions 
on the interbank bond market. Three banks (Pudong Development Bank, Industrial Bank and 
Bank of Communications) alone issued a total of RMB130 bn, claiming 84% of the total value 
of the LGBs issued. By October 2017, more than 70% of the LGBs were issued by financial 
institutions (CSJ, 2017). In the ChinaBond China Climate-aligned Bond Index, government-
backed bonds account for 70.8% (Kidney and Liu, 2017). 90% of climate-aligned bonds in 
China were issued by entities backed by the sovereign or sub-sovereign government (CBI, 
2017a). 
2. Some issuers have treated LGBs as an opportunity to top-up their capital, as the regulation 
of NDRC (2015b) allows LGB issuers to use up to 50% of the proceeds to repay bank loans 
and invest in general working capital (CBI and CCDC, 2017a). This rule contrasts with no 
more than 10% by CBT standards. 
3. A key advantage of LGBs was expedited process of administrative approval for issuance (ji 
bao ji pi in Chinese). Industry insiders estimate that it would take only one month to obtain 
approval for an LGB, compared with three months for the approval of normal bonds.7  
 
In other words, what drove the explosive growth of LGBs in 2016 was financialisation and 
financial statism in China and the selective relaxation of state control. However, two factors are 
now undermining the further growth of LGBs: 
1. Many market players are sceptical of the net benefits of LGBs because of disparity in 
standards and high issuance costs. According to a report on Chinese Securities Journal, 
average issuance costs had risen from 3.24% in 2016 to 4.47% for the first 10 months of 
2017 (CSJ, 2017). Based on like-for-like comparison and publicly available information, 
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research finds that in the third quarter of 2017, 77% of the green bonds were issued at a 
higher cost of funding than their comparable non-green equivalents in China (CBI and 
CCDC, 2017b). In comparison, 56.5% of the LGBs issued until 30 June 2017 had cost 
advantage compared with comparable vanilla bonds (GFC, 2017). 
2. Second, rather than improving on meeting international green standards, green bond 
issuance in China seems to suffer from falling standards. The percentage of internationally 
aligned Chinese LGBs was only 63.5% in the third quarter of 2017, compared with 78.2% in 
the first half of the year; the ratio of LGBs with second opinions fell by 26% in the third 
quarter of 2017 (CBI and CCDC, 2017b).  
 
On the other hand, the Chinese green bond market is highly unbalanced between its onshore 
component and its offshore component. While the domestic green bond market has expanded 
rapidly as a whole, the offshore bond market has grown slowly because of the constraints of 
approval process of overseas bond issuance and capital flow controls. In 2016, 26% of the 
green bonds were issued outside China (CBI and CCDC, 2017a). However, as of the end of 
October 2017, capital raised from offshore LGBs amounted to a total of USD$7.9 bn, accounting 
for only 12.6% of the total (CBI et al. 2017). While this ratio is much higher than that of the 
ordinary bond market, where foreign investors own less than 2% of the capitalization, it means 
that the LGBs boom in China remains a domestic phenomenon. 
This dual market structure means that there remain to be significant barriers for international 
businesses and institutions (UK’s included) to be more deeply involved in the green bond 
market in China. Some of these are related specifically to green bond market itself such as the 
lack of unified green standards and insufficient understanding about the opportunities among 
potential issuers and investors, whereas others are more deeply rooted in the wider economic 
management regime in China ranging from the lack of transparency of Chinese credit rating 
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systems, capital flows control, market access, to the lack of participation by non- state actors 
(CBI et al., 2017).  
One of the barriers is the centralised control over overseas debts. A key instrument of this 
control is the reformed registration system concerning corporate debts issuance in overseas 
markets, introduced by the NDRC (2015a). This system removes the need for corporations to 
apply for individual quotas for issuing debts abroad and replaces it with a system of registration 
system, which is supposed to simplify the process. In practice, however, state control is 
exercised through the imposition of an annual cap on the total foreign debts that corporations 
can occur nationally (or for sub-national jurisdictions for selected provinces or banks). Once this 
cap is reached, it becomes impossible for corporations to obtain NDRC registration, which 
effectively blocks the path to offshore debt issuance (CBI et al., 2017). 
Given the predominance of state-backed entities in issuing LGBs and the control over overseas 
debts, it is reasonable to assume that Chinese corporations are not free to decide when and 
where to issue their green bonds. Industry insiders commented on the ‘politicised’ nature of 
such decisions. For example, the LGB issuance by the BoC in London in November 2016 was 
arranged to coincide with the visit of the Chinese Vice-Premier Ma Kai to the UK.8  
Effects on UK-China Green Finance Business Opportunities 
The UK has so far scooped only two of the nine offshore LGBs listings by Chinese entities, 
accounting for 18% of the capital raised (see Table 3). Given the acknowledged strategic 
partnership in green finance between UK and China (HM Treasury, 2017), this outcome 
requires explanation. 
Table 3 List of Chinese Labelled Green Bonds Offshore9  








   
 
Agricultural Bank of China December 
2015 
994 UK 
London Taxi Company (Geely) May 2016 400 Singapore 
Xinjiang Golden wind  May 2016 152 Hong Kong, China 
    
Bank of China July 2016 3030 Luxembourg & US10 
Bank of China November 
2016 
500 UK 
Three Gorge Corporation June 2017 725.9 Ireland 
Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China 
October 2017 2150 Luxembourg 
China Development Bank  November 
2017 
1620 Hong Kong and 
Germany 
Bank of China November 
2017 
1450 France 
All   8262.5  
Memo items    
Share of UK  18.08%  
Share of Luxembourg  59.95%  
Sources: CBI et al., (2017) Facilitating Cross-Border Capital Flows to Grow the China Green 
Bond Market, p. 10. Percentages for UK and Luxemburg are calculated by author. 
To start with, this disappointing result for UK can be attributed at least partly to inter-hub 
competition between the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and the Luxembourg Stock Exchange 
(LuxSE). LuxSE was the first exchange to list a green bond in 2007. Although the LSE 
introduced a green bonds list in July 2015, the LuxSE launched the Luxembourg Green 
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Exchange (LGX) in September 2016, making it the first ever platform dedicated entirely to green 
securities (CBI, 2017b). In China, LuxSE teamed up with the SZSE to launch the CUFE-CNI 
Green Bond Index Series. Furthermore, September 2017 saw the signing of a memorandum of 
cooperation between the SSE and the LuxSE over green bonds, especially to increase market 
transparency through green bond information display (CBI and CCDC, 2017b). As of April 2017, 
LGX listed 112 green bonds (CBI, 2017b). The total value of LGBs listed on LGX stood at 
EUR50.3 billion (about £43.8 billion) in May 2017 (CBI, 2017d).  By comparison, at the end of 
November 2017, the number of green bonds listed on LSE was 59, with USD20.2 bn equivalent 
raised (LSE, 2017). Evidently LSE is so far significantly behind LuxSE on hosting green bonds. 
However, coupled with the dominance of state-backed entities, the wide geopolitical spread of 
Chinese overseas LGB listings exhibited by Table 3 also suggests that there is likely a 
deliberate strategy that is at work by Chinese issuers as vehicles of state policy. It is possible 
that the role of the UK in global politics may have worked against it in this instance, as the logic 
of hedging would suggest. It is also likely that Brexit has diminished the attractiveness of 
London as a financial hub. Further research is needed to explore the possible effect of cost 
differences, as one interviewee suggested. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This article has addressed two key research questions around the drivers of rapid LGB 
development in China, the contribution of the UK-China collaboration and the effects on UK-
China trade. Its analysis strongly supports the hypothesis that a combination of financial statism 
and the pursuit of ‘ecological civilisation’ is the key driving force for LGB development in China, 
although international collaboration has also played a part. On the other hand, despite UK’s 
contribution towards this development, four factors have limited the commercial benefits for UK 
from this development, including: (a) low volume of financial transactions between UK and 
China; (b) limited financial market openness in China; (c) possible adoption of a hedging 
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strategy by China in allocating offshore listing opportunities of Chinese LGBs; (d) inter-hub 
competition.  
Do these findings mean that the UK-China collaboration in green finance has failed for UK? Far 
from it. At least three positive outcomes have come about. First, through this collaboration, UK 
has been able to make progress on its second and third objectives. Two kinds of mechanism 
can be identified. First, there are substantive resonance (a) between China’s ‘Scientific Outlook 
on Development’ and the global sustainable development agenda; (b) between China’s 
‘ecological civilisation’ drive and Ecological Modernisation theory and practices; and finally, (c) 
between the international ‘greening finance’ agenda and China’s effort on this front. Second, as 
shown earlier, the Chinese LGB market is at least six times (12.6% vs under 2%) more open 
than the mainstream interbank bond market in terms of the proportion of capital raised from 
foreign investors. Therefore, notwithstanding limitations, China is moving in the direction that the 
UK encourages.  
Second, the collaboration has consolidated UK’s identity as a tutor for China and added 
credence to UK’s claim of global leadership in green finance. Third and finally, UK may have 
also learnt from its interaction with China. For example, the UK established in September 2017 
its own Green Finance Taskforce to ‘help deliver the investment needed to meet the UK’s 
Industrial Strategy and Clean Growth Strategy; further consolidate the UK’s leadership in 
financing international clean investment; and maximise the opportunities to be had for UK 
businesses in this rapidly growing area’ (BEIS and HMT, 2017). Somewhat going against the 
grains of UK’s liberal tradition, establishing the task force and formulating the Industrial Strategy  
and Clean Growth Strategy may have been stimulated by the interaction with China. In this 




   
 
On the other hand, this article raises some research questions for China. For instance, is 
financial market closedness and heavy regulation bad for China’s pursuit of global leadership in 
green finance?  The answer is likely to be ‘yes’, as China’s current lead in green finance is very 
much based on the use of administrative levers and the state-backed financial institutions, 
rather than allowing the market to play its true role. Obviously, success based on such 
unconventional institutional arrangements has limited relevance to other developing countries, 
making this ‘Chinese solution’ less useful to them. Another question is whether the same set of 
issues may affect the sustainability of its green finance industry, by limiting the latter’s 
integration with the global market and restricting the role of non-state actors. Again, the answer 
is likely to be ‘yes’. In other words, for China to become a true leader in green finance, it would 
be necessary for it to make the transition from simple learning - treating green finance merely as 
a tool to mobilise private capital - to complex learning by making fundamental changes to its 
economic system.  
Finally, what implication can we draw from this study in terms of the future of UK-China 
relationship, especially in the context of Brexit? Most importantly, the evidence presented in this 
article puts a question mark over the assumption that China could fill the trade void left by the 
EU trade partners to a large extent, as breaking down the structural and behavioral barriers will 
take time. Indeed, even setbacks are possible. In their study of the Renminbi Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investment (RQFII) scheme and its effects on London, Töpfer and Hall (2017) 
identify a dispersed allocation of the RQFII quotas by China, similar to the allocation of offshore 
LGB listings here. They notice the City of London’s diminished interest in the RMB business 
because of reduced expectation of the appreciation of RMB (and related business opportunities) 
and the lack of integration of the Chinese banks in London under their exclusionary staffing 
policy.  In fact, the share of RMB as a currency for international payments has declined from 
1.60% in December 2015 to 0.98% in December 2017 (SWIFT, 2018). In the light of these, it 
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would be mistaken to expect quick systemic changes in China and to Sino-British trade 
relations.   
 
ENDNOTES 
1 ICMA (2017) defines green bonds as ‘any type of bond instrument where the proceeds will be exclusively applied 
to finance or re-finance, in part or in full, new and /or existing eligible Green Projects…and which are aligned with 
the four core components of the GBP.’   
2 The G20 Green Finance Study Group (2016) defines green finance as ‘financing of investments that provide 
environmental benefits in the broader context of environmentally sustainable development’ (p. 3). 
3 Speech by Harriett Baldwin MP, Economic Secretary from the HM Treasury at the official launch of the City’s 
London’s Green Finance Initiative on 14th January 2016.  
4 This has been renamed G20 Sustainable Finance Study Group under the Argentina presidency (2018). 
5 Interview with a Chinese member of the Task Force in London on 31st January 2018. 
6 Climate aligned bonds include both labelled green bonds and unlabeled bonds issued by those entities who 
derive over 95% of their revenue from climate-aligned assets (CBI, 2016). 
7 Interview in Shanghai on 10 April 2017. 
8 Personal interview in London on the 31st May 2017. 
9 Some discrepancy between the data here and those in the Chinese official database for green bonds 
(http://greenfinance.xinhua08.com/zt/database/) is detected. We have adopted the data here without adjustment 
due to incomplete comparability.  
10 According to http://greenfinance.xinhua08.com/zt/database/, the two jurisdictions are Luxembourg and Hong 
Kong. The issue was in five tranches: USD2.25 bn (in three tranches) and Euro500m listed on Luxembourg 
Exchange; RMB1.5 bn listed on Hong Kong Exchange. Converting Euro 500m at the exchange rate of 1.1075 obtains 
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